| Euro
Business Seminars in Australia and New Zealand
"The EURO -Success or Failure"
ANA HARBOUR GRAND HOTEL, SYDNEY
MR PAUL UMBRAZUNAS, DEUTSCHE BANK
THURSDAY 15 AUGUST 2002
Mr Umbrazunas's
Powerpoint presentation
The question of whether the Euro
can be described as a "success" or "failure" at this relatively
early stage cannot be answered as a simple binomial outcome
or with reference simply to one hurdle. It depends largely
upon what factors one considers important criteria to fulfill,
and the weighting on a relative basis one prescribes to
such criteria.
Generally, it is
submitted that one should look at the influence of the currency,
both within and outside of Euroland, the broader economic
statistics within Euroland, Euroland's external economic
influence, and the changes to the underlying financial system.
Without a doubt, Euroland and the
creation of the Euro has marked a watershed for the international
monetary system. The impact of the Euro has clearly not
been confined to the economies of its member states. It
has left its mark on the framework conditions for investment
and trade between Euroland and the rest of the world.
The new common currency
has created a stable setting for Euroland/external economic
relations and the second largest economy and financial market
after the US.
Monetary union has eliminated the
remaining FX risks between the participating countries.
Exchange rate volatility, which has repeatedly distorted
competitiveness in the corporate sector, has become a thing
of the past.
Greater certainty
will be provided for trade and long term investment so that
hedging costs are significantly reduced.
Although the USD
will maintain its key position in the global economy, the
Euro has advanced to become the second major currency in
the world.
Euroland
As can be seen from the figures Euroland
in terms of population, market size and percentage of global
GDP is a close second to the US. In addition, the Euro
area of exports of goods and services represents 19% of
world exports compared to 15% from the US and 9% from Japan.
Currency
Analysis
The importance of
the Euro as a currency on the global stage must be examined
having regard to the seven factors listed.
(i) Financing currency:
n
33% of worldwide money market
activity (US$ = 47.5%)
n
26% of international debt-narrow
measure (debt issued in a currency different to that of
the borrowers) which was 7% higher than the total share
of Euro legacy currencies as at the end of 1998
n
34% of international debt-broad
measure (denominated in home currency and targeted to the
international financial markets)
Reasons for growth include:
n
increased liquidity
n
increased M&A activity
n
diversification of debt by
several emerging market countries in favour of the Euro
n
efficient/competitive cost
of funds versus USD
n
larger pool of investors
(removal of 80/20 rule)
(ii) Investment currency:
Before
making the fundamental investment decision, potential buyers
will demand a high level of transparency, liquidity and
stability both at the macro (economic) and micro (instrument
specific) level.
In addition, return
hurdles must be met or potentially seen to be met.
In this regard, investors will look
at the relative productivity developments in each geographic
region. This is one of the main reasons for the (until
recently) poorer performance of the Euro versus the USD
(ie. sustained productivity differentials - although this
was indeed the case for the rest of the world versus the
US).
On the micro level,
investors need to have comfort about liquidity (and being
able to liquidate) as well as a sufficient degree of price
transparency.
As an investment currency, it is
worthwhile investigating international banking data and
the portfolio construction of international fund managers.
In relation to international banking assets, these include
loans, other debt securities and foreign equities.
n
Euro share of international
banking assets was 22% as at 9/00 which represents a 6%
increase since the start of Stage 3.
n
The estimated share of Euro
in the portfolio allocation of international fund managers
was 32% for bonds (US$ = 47%) and 25% for equities (US$
= 50%).
(iii) FX Markets:
As
a pricing and quotation currency, the Euro does not play
a role comparable to the US$ at a global level when one
considers:
n
trading volumes
n
bid/offer spreads
n
transaction costs
n
other market practices
(iv) Settlement and invoicing
(transaction/currency):
The
US$ is the predominant currency for the settlement of foreign
trade and the only one in extensive use as a "vehicle currency"
(ie non US trades).
The US$ role as the prime reserve
and transaction currency carries great advantages for the
US economy. It gives the US the power and ability other
countries do not have to finance its external deficits in
its own money.
It is suggested the longer term dynamic
implication of monetary union on invoicing habits is of
greater relevance to the importance of the Euro in the future
global currency system than it statistical one-off effects.
For many countries, Euroland is or will become the most
important trading partner.
(v) Reserve Currency:
Monetary
union has consequences for central bank reserve management
worldwide. A distinction must be made between the repercussions
on reserve maintenance by ECB and member banks and by those
of non-EU countries. A large proportion of the currency
reserves of USD held by the EU central banks were prompted
by their mutual intervention commitments within the framework
of EMS. These compulsory interventions are no longer necessary.
Moreover, the maximum intervention commitments of the ECB
within EMS will be restricted to a degree which does not
jeopardise monetary stability in the Euro area.
As
a reserve currency, the Euro share of total world foreign
reserves is comparable to that of its legacy currencies.
(vi) Anchor Currency
Plays some role in the exchange rate regime of 56 countries outside
the Euro area which however, on the whole account for only
4% of world GDP + 17% of Euro area GDP.
Bonds
As at the end of
2000, the Euro government debt securities market comprised
around 93% of its US counterpart.
The result of introduction of the
Euro has been to open up an attractive financial market
for investors offering a serious and equivalent to the US$.
Higher liquidity, a non/low inflationary environment and
less volatility as a result of lower susceptibility to exchange
rate disturbances has put the European bond market more
sharply into focus. The absence of exchange rate risks
means interest spread differentials of the EU members reflects
only creditworthiness and liquidity.
Unfortunately there
is still no uniform established yield curve.
This is a reflection
of the lack of uniform credit quality, liquidity issuance
patterns and that historically, bonds were issued largely
to meet the needs of the specific domestic customer base
and that the importance of national institutional structures
has not yet been fully eliminated.
Corporate bonds
have been the big winner with sharp increase in issuance
levels.
This has been fuelled
by demand from institutional investors.
Demand will continue
to be generated by factors such as:
n
Investor outperformance:
Prior to monetary union, European investors, predominantly
fixed interest investors generated higher returns through
currency plays. As the ability to outperform through this
method has disappeared, investors have needed to diversity
into credit products and equities.
n
Pension fund deficit:
The largest single risk to European sovereign spreads, in
the absence of asymmetric economic shock is the extent of
unfunded pension liability across the EMU regions.
Governments aware of this situation are encouraging a shift
towards increased private sector provision of pensions.
More households will save to supplement state pensions.
n
Demographics:
There will be a massive increase in the elderly population
of Europe over time. The trend in retirements in Europe
will have a rising impact after 2002 which will prompt investors
to seek higher yields. In general, during their earning
years, savers may seek higher returns in the equity market
but on retirement, many prefer to purchase annuities.
n
Removal of 80/20 rule
Regulatory constraints based on currency for insurance companies
necessarily disappear.
All intra-EMU currency restrictions on insurance companies
and pension funds investment becomes irrelevant.
[80/20 rule requires 80% of assets to be in the same currency
as liabilities.]
Equities
The proportion of European stocks
owned by private investors has grown from 10% to nearer
40% over the past five years. Gross issuance of international
equity by Euro area companies was almost doubled in 2001
compared with the previous two year period to $199 billion.
European pension funds (at $2.75
trillion) in 1999, up from $1.68 trillion five years ago
and expected to climb to $4 trillion by 2004 are increasing
asset allocations to equities. The estimated equity allocation
increased from 19 to 29% over the past four years helped
by the removal of some restrictions on equity investment
in the Euro area.
Investors in European
equity markets must now build strategies with a pan-European
perspective as prices increasingly reflect risk factors
specific to industrial sectors as opposed to the individual
currencies.
It is fair to say
though that perhaps the introduction of the common currency
has been felt more on the economic factors that drive share
prices and less on the structure of the trading of the same
securities.
There has been surprisingly
slow progress in bridging the gaps between existing equity
trading platforms in the Euro area in order to facilitate
the future development of a truly pan-European equity environment.
Some complexities integrating historically
independent markets, driven by local interests still remain.
In order to allow equity markets to reach their full potential,
liquidity must grow and transaction costs must be reduced.
Thus, market consolidation should be inevitable but will
remain difficult until post trade costs are reduced by consolidating
the clearing and settlement systems. (ie. Cross border
transactions remain quite expensive given the number of
organisations involved.)
Impact
on Trade & Investment
A major question that arises with the advent of the Euro is its effect
on trading and investments between Australia and Euroland.
Factors
such as the development of exchange rates, the cyclical
performance in the two regions as well as the remaining
barriers to trade and trade relations with the rest of the
world certainly play a more significant role overall than
MU and the Euro could conceivably do. In the long run,
however, the Euro will leave its mark on economic relations
by paving the way for more stable relations, by creating
easier access to the European goods and services markets
and by facilitating the financing of trade and investment
activities.
Corporates in Australia will need to reconsider their business strategies
in Europe in order to guarantee they can compete in the
more dynamic environment.
Trade
The most
important aspect for closer trade links between Australia
and Europe will result from the positive economic forces
set free by the Euro in Europe itself. Australian firms
will be able to enter one coherent market, free of the impediments
to internal trade with an impressive growth potential.
Australian corporates will be able to effect all the financial
transactions in the entire Euroland area in only one currency
which will clearly offer ample scope for streamlining their
treasury activities.
In addition, considerable cost savings can be achieved by exploiting
synergy effects in distribution networks and export financing
activities.
A word
of caution. At the same time, competition between firms
within Euroland will increase, making it harder to operate
in the area. Corporates will need to evaluate and weigh
the demands of the more competitive European markets against
the benefits of easier trade facilitated by one currency.
It should be noted that European companies may wish to exploit
their growing competitiveness outside Euroland and compete
directly with Australian corporates in third markets (eg
Asia).
The EU
member states not initially participating in the Euro (Denmark,
Sweden and the UK) should not be ignored. As competitive
pressures spill over into the non-participating countries
rather swiftly adjustments in market and industry structures
similar to those inside Euroland have occurred for these
countries as well. Consequently, Australian companies engaged
in trade primarily with the non-participating states will
not be spared the structural impact of the Euro.
Regardless
of whether an Australian firm has already established a
presence in the EU or whether it is planning to enter, the
Euro will greatly enhance sales and procurement possibilities,
as currency related obstacles to the mobility of goods,
services and factors within the EMU area will vanish. The
twelve union members will also serve as access points to
the entire EU and the emerging markets of Central and Eastern
Europe.
Selecting
a business location, be it from the perspective of established
firms or of entrant firms will be facilitated by EMU. As
considerations related to exchange rate risk no longer matter
for the choice of the right business location, enterprises
in future will be able to concentrate on the core decision
parameters related to the specific demands of their company
such as production costs, staff qualifications, proximity
of primary select markets and infrastructure. Most importantly,
there will no longer be a reason to maintain more than one
principal business location in Euroland only for the sake
of protecting the company against erratic exchange rate
movements and high currency related transaction costs.
Australian
firms should consider that pricing policies many have to
be revised in the face of increasing competition. In the
Monetary Union, cross border arbitrage will largely undermine
strategies of price differentiation. At the same time,
factor input prices will be under pressure, too, rendering
the EMU sector cheaper.
Nevertheless,
prices will not be identical across the EMU area. The same
is true of wage costs. Differences in taxation will continue
to prevail (eg national VAT rates between15% and 25%).
Furthermore, there are many different national norms and
customer preferences. In order to meet the pressure on
profit margins, companies engaged across Euroland may find
alternative strategies such as greater product differentiation.
Issues
for Business
n
Preparation is key with the
main issues to consider revolving around:
-
strategic business decisions
-
operational
-
financial
n
Whilst the Euro market clearly
opens up opportunities via greater transparency afforded,
liquidity and standardisation, it also creates threats from
increased competition, particularly in terms of scale and
conversely the level of transparency demanded.
Concluding
Remarks
In its formative
stages, there were always going to be questions asked about
the potential success of the Euro being hindered or mitigated
by the ability of European countries to efficiently form
a nation state without fiscal adjustment mechanisms, and
a perceived low mobility of labour.
This however neglects
a number of structural reforms in Europe that were commenced
nearly a decade ago (1993 EED established a single European
market).
So how does the
Euro overall "report card" read.
Overall, the Euro role in originating
and capitalising trends across the spectrum of financial
markets has been uneven. It is probably fair to say that
the impact has been more pronounced for fixed income, and
in particular credit markets than anywhere else. In terms
of currency, the Euro has performed as expected in the near
term particularly given the relative strengths and output
of competing economies. As far as the equity markets go,
there is still room to improve.
The critical mass achieved by full
integration has led to greater liquidity and transparency
which in turn, has led to a more efficient allocation of
capital. This process could be further improved by the
removal of inconsistent intra-Euroland legal, regulatory
and institutional infrastructures, some of which are motivated
by local interests and national historical experiences.
Most importantly
though, as the internal economic strength and success of
the Euro area grows, so the importance of the Euro as a
global currency also grows.
Translated, this
means:
Given such a young age, the Euro
is showing achievements across subjects at a different rate.
Nonetheless, one thing is certain, further significant potential
has already been tangibly demonstrated through results to
date and it would be difficult to believe that given such
accomplishments, the Euro will not be anything but a success
story over time.
Transcript
MR
UMBRAZUNAS: I am a first-generation Australian.
My family is Lithuanian. My mother is Slovenian. She grew
up in Trieste in Italy. I work for a German Bank; I think
that is why they chose me. Hopefully, I will be able to able
to enlighten you a bit more on the Euro. I was asked whether
the Euro can be considered a success or failure. I do not
think it is a simple binomial outcome of yes or no. As you
will see from my slides, the success has been uneven across
markets. I will go into more detail about that. I want to
look at a couple of criteria both within and outside of those
Euroland, looking briefly at the currency of the various financial
markets and trade and investment flows.
Just
to set the stage, without a doubt the EMU has marked a watershed
for the international monetary system. The impact of the Euro
has clearly not been confined to the economies of its member
states. It has left its mark on the framework conditions for
investment and trade between Euroland and the rest of the
world. The new common currency has created a stable setting
for Euroland's stable economic relations and the second largest
financial economy in the world after the US.
Monetary
union has eliminated the remaining FX risks between participating
countries. Exchange rate volatility, which repeatedly disturbed
competitiveness in the corporate sector, has become a thing
of the past. This has facilitated the exchange of goods, services
and capital required in the corporate sector. Greater certainty
will be provided for trade and long-term investment so that
hedging costs are significantly reduced. Although the US dollar
will maintain it to keep recognition on a global scale. The
Euro has advanced to become the second major currency in the
world.
I
will look at some statistics to compare the Euro with the
US. Population wise and GDP, it is slightly smaller than the
US. Interestingly, though, Euroland has a higher global share
of world exports than the US. That is, looking at the three
key members, you can a get a scale very much akin to the US
in terms of population and GDP.
What
we did here was try to normalise the population versus GDP.
The comment to make about the US is that in that significant
outperformmance, if you want to call it that, is largely currency
related and the fact the US dollar has been so strong. You
can see from the inflation figures that Euroland and US are
trekking fairly similarly.
Unemployment
rates that are converging are now starting to flatten up.
The equity market capitalisation is significantly below in
Euroland. This is where I think Euroland has underperformed
in terms of other financial markets. Bear in mind that part
of our performance in the US is the irrational exuberance
that Dr Greenspan has mentioned. However harder it is for
Euroland, some of the equity markets still remain fragmented
and not as unified as we would like.
I
would like to turn to the currency. We have already mentioned
some of the aspects. I have looked at those seven aspects
in terms of determining how important the currency was on
a global stage. Looking at the financing, presently, George's
and my figures were fairly similar, which is a good thing.
Thirty-four per cent of total global financing.
The
investment currency. Clearly investment decisions are determined
by how the wealthy economies are going, given the US has benefited
form a fairly strong economy. So the fundamental investment
decisions in the US were distorted because of that and because
of relative productivity. The Euro has about 22% of international
banking assets. I would suggest that number is higher, unfortunately,
as it was September 2000. Given the degree of merger activity
in Euroland, particularly in the telco sector, I think that
number is probably closer to 30% now. Similarly, global fund
managers have a bond allocation of around one-third and around
25% allocation of global equities.
In
terms of FX markets, as a quotation currency, it is about
on par with the Deutschmark, given the trading volumes, the
bid/offer spreads and the transaction costs we see.
The
interesting area of growth going forward in the Euro is the
settlement and invoicing aspect. I think, as it has been mentioned,
the Euro dollar is a predominant vehicle currency for global
trade. This is the US great power and ability other countries
don't have in terms of being able to finance its own external
deficit in its own country. I suggest that the longer-term
dynamic implication of monetary union on the invoicing habits
will be of greater relevance of the importance of the Euro
in the future global currency system than its statistical,
one-off effects. For many countries, including Australia,
Euroland is or will become the most important trading partner.
Looking
at the statistics on the reserve currency, they are pretty
much akin to the sum of the legacy currencies. As an anchor
currency, around 56 countries are largely pegged to Euroland
in terms of geography or time zone.
I
want to look at the bond market, in which I think the largest
impact has occurred. At the end of 2000, Euro government debt
securities market comprised around 93% of its US counterpart.
The result of the introduction of the Euro has begun to open
up attractive financial markets for investors, offering a
serious and equivalent alternatives to the US dollar. Higher
liquidity, a low inflation environment, less volatility as
a result of the lower susceptibility to exchange rate disturbances
has put the European bond market more sharply into focus.
The absence of exchange rate risks means interest spread differentials
of the EU members reflects only credit worthiness and liquidity.
The
main problem Euroland suffers from at the moment is no established
yield curve. In the US, you have the US Treasury market. In
Euroland, we tend to use German government bonds for the longer
end of the curve and French government bonds for the intermediate
part of the curve. This is a reflection of the lack of uniform
credit quality liquidity and issuance patterns when historically
bonds are issued. The argument is that specific domestic customer
bases and that the importance of national institutional structures
has not been fully eliminated.
However,
I think the corporate bond market has been the big winner.
You see it in the final bullet point, we have had borrowers
outside the Euro area issued 21% of international debt in
Euros as compared to 2% in the legacy currencies. This last
point clearly demonstrates the global legitimacy of the currency,
given that people outside the Euroland view it as an efficient
cost of funds. We remain quite bullish on the bond market
in terms of its ongoing demand for Euro securities. I will
go through those points.
The
first is pension fund deficits. There is a significant risk
in Europe of unfunded pension liabilities. Governments are
aware of the situation and are addressing it by pushing more
savings into the private sector, much akin to what we are
doing in terms of our savings here. With demographics, Europe
is getting older. Retirements are increasing, particularly
from this year. Generally, in the earning years you tend to
invest in equities and get some growth. Upon retirement, you
tend to take a more conservative view and invest in annuity-type
products such as bonds.
The
removal of the 80-20 rule. That simply was a rule that insurance
companies and mutual funds were required to invest 80% of
their assets in the same currency as their liabilities. Given
there is only one currency now, that rule is an irrelevance.
There
is pressure to outperform returns. Prior to the single currency,
fund managers would outperform indexes by playing currencies
between participants in Euroland. Again, that has disappeared
so fund managers will have to look at structural and credit
analysis when they make investment decisions. Continuing disintermediation
simply means people in Deutsch Bank don't have the right to
lend as much as they did in the past. We are looking at things
like return on capital and return on equity. As a result,
people who need funds will turn more and more to the bond
markets.
Looking
at the equity markets, a proportion of European stocks owned
by private investors has increased to 10% to close to 40%
over the past five years, largely fuelled by private donations.
European pension funds under management, which we estimated
at around $2.75 trillion in 1999 is up from $1.68 trillion
five years ago. We think it will climb to something in the
order of $4 trillion by 2004. There is an increase in the
allocation towards equities. Over the past four years, we
believe that asset allocations moved from something in the
order of 19% to 29%, helped by the removal of some but not
all restrictions on equity investments in the Euro areas.
It
is fair to say, though, that the introduction of the common
currency has been felt more on the economic factors that drive
the share prices and less on the structure of the trading
of the securities underlying. Fund managers similarly have
had to rely on industry specific factors rather than country
factors in making their equity allocation decisions. However,
there has been surprising slow process in bridging the gaps
between equity trading platforms in the Euro area in order
to facilitate the future development of a truly pan-European
equity environment.
Some
complexities integrating historically independent markets
driven by local interests still remain. In order to allow
equity to markets to reach their full potential, liquidity
must grow and transaction costs must be reduced. That is why
market consolidation should remain inevitable. It remains
difficult until post-trade costs are reduced by consolidating
the clearing and settlement systems. That means it is costing
people too much to process their equity trades in write tickets
in between the various clearing and exchange systems. Hence,
some of the underperformance in the previous graph of the
US versus Euroland.
I
will turn briefly to trade and investment. A major question
arises with the advent of the Euro's effect on trading and
investments between Australia and Euroland. Factors such as
the development of exchange rates, the cyclical performance
in the two regions as well as the remaining barriers to trade
and trade relations with the rest of the world certainly play
a more significant role than the Euro conceivably could do.
In the long run, however, the Euro will leave its mark on
economic relations by paving the way for more stable relations,
by creating easier access to the European goods and services
market and by facilitating financing of trade and investment
activities. As a result, corporates in Australia will have
to reconsider their business strategies in Europe in order
to guarantee they can compete in this dynamic environment.
This
is a graph I mentioned earlier about the global share of exports
just to show the importance of Euroland in this global scheme
of things. You see it is quite higher than the US in terms
of its scale and size.
The
most important aspects are closer trade links between Australia
and Europe as a result of the positive economic forces set
free in Europe itself. Australian firms will be able to go
into one coherent market free of the impediments to internal
trade with an impressive growth potential. Australian corporates
will be able to effect all financial transactions in Euroland
in the one currency, which will clearly offer ample scope
for streamlining of Treasury and accounting activities.
In
addition, considerable cost savings can be achieved by exploiting
synergy effects and distribution networks on export financing
activities. At the same time, however, competition between
firms within the Euroland will increase, making it harder
to operate in Euroland. Corporates will need to evaluate and
weigh the demands of the more competitive European markets
against the benefits of easier trade facilitated by the EMU.
It should be noted also that European companies may wish to
exploit their going competitiveness outside Euroland and compete
with Australian corporates in third markets, for example,
in Asia.
I
want to show comparative trade balances between other parts
of the world. EU Member States not participating in the Euroland,
including Denmark, Sweden and the UK, should not be ignored.
As
competitive pressures spill over into the long participating
countries swiftly, adjustments in market and industry structures
similar to those inside Euroland have occurred. Consequently,
Australian companies engaged in trade with non-participating
states will not be spared the structural impact of the Euro.
Now
to a few business aspects. Clearly, the key is preparation
and the broader preparation of frameworks. One is strategic
business decisions, operational decisions and financial decisions.
While the Euro market clearly opens up opportunities via greater
transparency afforded, liquidity and standardisation, it also
creates threats from increased competition, particularly in
terms of scale and conversely, the level of transparency that
is demanded.
I
have noted very briefly some of the opportunities and threats.
Tim Harcourt from Austrade will be able to tell you how to
take advantage of those opportunities and mitigate those threats.
We are entering a larger, more coherent and transparent market.
However, it is a more competitive market and a greater degree
of transparency will be demanded of you.
I
will conclude on where we see the Euro and its success or
failure. In these formative stages, there will be questions
asked about the potential of the success of the Euro being
hindered or mitigated by the ability of European countries
to efficiently form a nation state without fiscal adjustment
mechanisms and a perceived low mobility of labour. This, however,
neglects the number of structural reforms in Europe that began
a decade ago.
How
do we look at the Euro report card? Overall, the Euro is initiating
and capitalising trends across a spectrum of financial markets
has been uneven. It is probably fair to say that the impact
has been more pronounced for fixed income and in particular
credit markets than anywhere else. In terms of the currencies,
the Euro has performed as expected in the near term, particularly
given the relative strengths of outputs of competing economies.
As far as the equity markets go, there is still room to improve.
The
critical mass achieved by full integration has led to greater
liquidity and transparency, which in turn has led to a more
efficient allocation of capital. This process could further
be improved by the level of inconsistent intra-Euroland legal,
regulatory and institutional infrastructures, some of which
are motivated by local interest and some by national and historical
experiences.
Most
importantly though, as the internal economic strength of Euroland
grows, so too does Euro as a global currency. Due to it being
such a young age, the Euro is showing achievement for subjects
at a different rate. One thing is certain: further significant
potential has already been demonstrated through results to
date. It is difficult to believe that, given such accomplishments,
the Euro will not be anything but a success story over time.
ENDS
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